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Introduction
Since World War Two organizations concerned with international health have selected a number of diseases as priorities for control. In the 1950s malaria was a focus.
In the 1970s smallpox received significant attention. In the 1990s target diseases have included AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and a set of children's vaccine-preventable diseases.
Over the past five decades a continuous stream of diseases have risen on to and fallen off the global disease agenda.
How do diseases come to occupy places of high priority? One explanation is through rational selection. Global health organizations give attention to a disease when its burden becomes high relative to others and when researchers develop cost-effective means of interrupting transmission. A competing explanation is through incremental change. A disease captures the attention of more and more health leaders and interventions diffuse gradually to reach afflicted populations. A third answer presumes a more complex dynamic. Little change takes place over extended periods and efforts to fight the disease are confined to select populations. At certain junctures bursts of priority emerge and interventions spread in concentrated periods of time to reach people across the globe.
The subject of how global disease control priorities emerge has received little attention in the literature on health policy. The aim of this paper is to raise this issue, to evaluate which model best portrays the process and to suggest factors that may shape priority patterns. We analyze the post-World War Two histories of efforts to control three diseases -poliomyelitis, malaria and tuberculosis -to investigate these questions.
These three diseases make interesting case studies since each has been the target of global control efforts and has risen on to and fallen off the international policy agenda at various junctures.
In the following section we lay out the three models in greater detail. We then turn to the case histories, focusing on the actors, discoveries and events that shaped the emergence of disease control priorities. In the conclusion we draw from these case studies to assess which model best portrays the process, and to point to the factors that may be shaping patterns of change in priority for individual diseases.
Background
The three models each have a tradition in the public policy field. The rationality model is employed by many economics-oriented policy analyses that use cost-benefit calculations to select among competing alternatives. It is founded on a presumption that policy-makers define carefully the nature of the problems they face, propose alternative solutions, eva luate these solutions on the basis of a set of uniform and objective criteria, and select and implement the best solutions. In health policy the desire to inject rationality into resource allocation decisions in developing countries is the impetus behind the development of the disability-adjusted life-year, or DALY, a measure of the number of healthy life-years lost in a population due to a particular disease . Proponents of the indicator hope that policymakers will use it to direct resources toward interventions that maximize the total reduction in DALYs.
Many scholars who have studied the political dynamics of policy-making believe that the model does not capture how policy is formulated in practice, questioning the presumption that actors deliberate in a logical, linear fashion (Kingdon 1984; March and Simon 1958; Lindblom 1959) . Among the points they raise are that actors have limited information, are not able to imagine all the alternatives, even if cognizant of multiple alternatives are not likely to consider each systematically, hold ambiguous goals, and change these goals as they act. An alternative understanding of the agenda setting process, termed incrementalism, has emerged that takes into account a number of these critiques (Kingdon 1984: 83-84) . Drawing in part from research on public budgetary processes, scholars have postulated that policy-makers are inclined to take the status quo as given and carry out only small changes at a time, making the policy-making process less complex and more manageable than a comprehensive rational deliberative process would entail (Lindblom 1959; Wildavsky 1979 ). Baumgartner and Jones (1993) challenge the adequacy of both the rationality and the incrementalist models, drawing on research that models policy agenda-setting in far more anarchic terms (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984) . Their punctuated equilibrium model postulates periods of stability with minimal or incremental change, disrupted by bursts of rapid transformation. Central to their model are the concepts of the policy image and the policy venue. The policy image is the way in which a given problem and set of solutions are conceptualized. One image may predominate over a long period of time, but may be challenged at particular moments as new understandings of the problem and alternatives come to the fore. The policy venue is the set of actors or institutions that make decisions concerning a particular set of issues. These actors may hold monopoly power but will eventually face competition as new actors with alternative policy images gain prominence. When a particular policy venue and image hold sway over an extended period of time, the policy process will be stable and incremental. When new actors and images emerge, rapid bursts of change are possible. Thus, the policy process is constituted both by stability and change, rather than one or the other alone, and cannot be characterized exclusively in terms of incrementalism or rationality.
The case of polio
In the early 1950s Jonas Salk developed a killed vaccine for poliomyelitis and in 1961 Albert Sabin followed with a live vaccine. Rapidly thereafter several hundred million children in industrialized states were immunized against the disease, and polio incidence plummeted in the developed world (http://www.sabin.org). It was not until more than a decade later, however, that the disease received serious attention in developing countries. In 1974 the World Health Organization launched the expanded program on immunization to combat a number of vaccine-preventable diseases that affected children, including polio.
Through the 1970s and 1980s support for devoting priority to polio control spread gradually across public health and medical communities. Several factors contributed to the growing attention (Horstmann 1984; Raymond 1986; Assad and Ljungar-Esteves 1984) . First, a number of developing countries, including Cuba, Brazil and Mexico, launched mass polio immunization campaigns and experienced a considerable decline in disease incidence, demonstrating that it was possible for less industrialized nations to fight the disease effectively. Second, a series of lameness surveys in developing countries indicated that the disease was widespread in tropical and semi-tropical areas.
This discovery challenged long-standing presumptions that polio was a 'disease of civilization' unlikely to become endemic in less developed settings. Third, the eradication of smallpox, the first successful global disease campaign of its kind, was completed in 1977, giving health communities confidence in the possibility of disease eradication and sparking discussion on which disease should be the next target.
This was precisely the subject of a 1980 conference organized at the National Institutes of Health in the United States in the wake of the smallpox eradication success.
Delegates from multiple organizations attended, including the Centers for Disease (Evans 1984; Creese 1984; Ward 1984; WHO 1983: 349) . Also, some delegates argued that the move toward horizontal primary healthcare made a vertically-oriented eradication program ill-advised, and unlikely to generate sufficient political support (Chin 1984; Robinson 1984) . Other delegates, however, expressed optimism and called for a global eradication initiative (Gregg 1984) .
The meeting ended without a consensus on the subject, and with a call for flexible approaches at the national level for polio control (Robbins 1984) .
A number of subsequent developments in the second half of the 1980s contributed to an increase in confidence in the possibility of eradication. In 1985 Rotary
International initiated a global fund-raising effort to support the World Health Organization's polio immunization efforts (Smith 1988) . Also in 1985, the member countries of PAHO announced a formal commitment to seeking to eliminate indigenous transmission of the disease from the Americas region by the year 1990 (Daniel and Robbins 1997: 19; WHO 1985: 394 
Launch of global polio eradication initiative
The demonstration effects of PAHO's efforts and success cannot be over- 
Policy models and the case of polio
If we examine the case of polio in the context of existing models of the policy process we see that rational and incremental models cannot adequately account for the historical ebbs and flows of polio control initiatives. The rationality model does capture dimensions of the experience, including aspects of the scientific investigations that led to discovery of the vaccines, and deliberation among public health and medical professionals concerning strategies for making these vaccines available to children in the developing world. Incrementalism also captures dimensions of the process, particularly the gradual spread of faith through the 1970s and 1980s in the idea of eradication.
However, the dynamics of polio control involved not only rational deliberation and incremental change. They also involved sudden bursts of attention. In the course of just several years in the late 1950s and early 1960s following vaccine development, most children in the advanced industrial world were inoculated and disease rates plummeted.
Three decades later the World Health Assembly committed itself to eradicating the disease from the earth and priority swept across the developing world like a tidal wave.
The history of polio control involved extended periods of incrementalism punctuated by bursts of rapid change. These bursts were sparked by the emergence of new policy venues -coalitions of global health actors -and a new policy image -faith in the possibility of eradication. Across time polio control exhibited a pattern of punctuated equilibria.
The case of malaria
Malaria was regarded as a major public health problem even before World War Two but it was not until the discovery of dichlorodipheny dichloromethane (DDT) during the war that the first global efforts to fight the disease emerged. Since then the world has experienced two major anti-malaria campaigns, each pushed by a different coalition of actors and grounded in a different set of images concerning the nature of the problem and appropriate solutions.
The eradication wave
The discovery of DDT sparked widespread faith among international health organizations that it was possible to eradicate this long-standing scourge. The strategy was simple: spray malaria-endemic areas extensively to reduce the number of infected mosquitoes below the critical level of density, and the malaria parasite will no longer be transmitted -or so it was believed. In 1954, the 14 th Pan American Sanitary Conference adopted a plan for the eradication of malaria from the Americas and in the same year, the Second Asian Malaria Conference recommended that the ultimate goal of nationwide malaria control programs should be eradication. The WHO's World Health Assembly adopted this policy in 1955. A sense of urgency marked these calls for action, prompted by a fear that if not comple ted rapidly insecticide resistance would emerge (Spielman et. al 1993) .
The World Health Organization immediately embarked on a coalition-building effort to support the initiative, forging an alliance of Third World states, UN agencies including UNICEF, and governments of industrialized states, most importantly the United States. UNICEF participation was grounded, in the words of one its key malaria experts, in the observation that, "a successful eradication programme will save…more children's lives than all the other UNICEF-aided programmes put together" (cited in Farid 1980, 13) . Cold war political and economic self-interest may in part have prompted U.S. government involvement. In Asia, the United States concentrated its assistance to India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, countries surrounding the periphery of the People's
Republic of China, its communist adversary in the region (Spielman et. al 1993) . Also, a U.S. government report stated that the burden of disease, "constitutes a hidden malaria tax of more than a third of a billion dollars paid annually by the United States on its imports" (IDAB 1956 ). The United States was the primary financier for this campaign, (Najera 1999) . USAID also supported vaccine and drug development (Spielman et. al 1993) . These initiatives formed the groundwork and created a set of intervention instruments for a campaign that was to emerge in the late 1990s.
Through these years the WHO struggled to keep the malaria issue alive in the international health community. In the early 1990s it finally began to meet with success.
In 1992 
Advances from developing countries in tuberculosis treatment
Meanwhile, developing country health leaders, with few resources of their own and none slated for tuberculosis coming from the developed world, were unable to afford expensive institutions and the training of specialized personnel (Bayer and Wilkinson 1995) . While these advances influenced control programs in a handful of developing countries, they were not enough to have a significant impact on this widespread problem.
Resource constraints continued to put adequate tuberculosis care out of reach for the majority of the world's poor. It would take developments elsewhere to change this situation.
Priority for tuberculosis control emerges
In 1986 warned that (1993), "TB elimination in the United States will not be possible without a substantial reduction in the global TB burden." These reports reflected a concern that the demography of TB would shift to other populations if it were not controlled in these 'high-risk' groups. As Bayer and Wilkinson put it (1995) , media attention and public concern about those failing to complete their treatment grew, "…as a result of the fear that what had been a treatable disease might become an untreatable danger to middleclass populations that had in recent years been spared the threat of tuberculosis."
The significance for the global health agenda of this new attention to TB in the United States, and of a similar alarm in Europe (Raviglione et al. 1992; Rieder 1992) , is immeasurable. Congress increased funding for the CDC's TB control efforts to $25 million in 1991, and raised it again to $104 million for 1993 (Bayer and Wilkinson 1995) . 4 Major international organizations involved with health suddenly became concerned about the disease. The WHO initiated TB program reviews in the early 1990s in cooperation with the World Bank (Pio et al. 1997) . 
Conclusion
Global attention for polio, malaria and tuberculosis control emerged surprisingly in the 1990s, in ways that no observer a decade earlier trying to envision disease priority trends could have imagined. 5 These surges and the erratic post-World War Two histories of priority for containing these diseases expose shortcomings in the rationalist and incrementalist frameworks, taken individually, as models of disease priority generation.
Elements of each do capture portions of the process. Disease burden and the availability of cost-effective interventions shaped priority levels. At times attention grew and interventions spread incrementally. However, both rationalism and incrementalism miss the ebbs and flows of policy attention, and have nothing to say about the surprising bursts of priority that have infused the histories of polio, malaria and tuberculosis control. The framework that corresponds most closely to the three case histories is the punctuated equilibrium model.
What underpins these patterns of long periods of incremental change punctuated by bursts of rapid transformation? The emergence of disease control campaigns required a convergence of conditions. They did not appear until (1) a disease was widely considered to be a major problem, (2) a disease was perceived to be amenable to containment through human intervention and, (3) a coalition had formed of powerful institutional actors that believed it to be worthwhile to fight the disease. The first two conditions concern the policy image -how the problem is conceptualized and the solution understood. The third condition concerns the policy venue -the set of actors who hold decision-making power over the issue. The creation of each condition involved extensive groundwork, making the emergence of priority incremental for periods of time. Once all three conditions appeared, however, disease control initiatives took on a momentum of their own, producing the punctuated pattern.
6
The case studies point to the significant groundwork involved in creating these conditions. Scientists, health policy experts and members of international organizations debated for a decade which disease should follow smallpox as the next target for global eradication. Support for polio emerged gradually as more and more health leaders The case studies also point to the bursts produced by the coupling of conditions.
Once scientists noticed that polio was a burden in less developed areas, health leaders understood the disease to be eradicable, and several internatio nal organizations pledged support to fight the disease, then government after government mobilized for an eradication campaign. Once African leaders made the global health community aware of malaria's tremendous burden, several cost-effective interventions had been developed, and a WHO and World Bank led alliance created, then the roll-back malaria campaign began in earnest. Once the industrialized countries discovered tuberculosis to be a threat, the WHO identified DOTS as the treatment of choice, and a transnational coalition of health organizations had formed, then tuberculosis became a priority disease in all highburden countries.
It is interesting to note that the construction of policy images concerning disease threat and amenability to human intervention were social mediated, involving symbols, images and emotions as much as rational deliberation. The fear of political elites of industrialized countries was necessary for tuberculosis, a disease that had always been endemic in the developing world, to become a 'global' threat. The discovery of DDT sparked an exuberant faith in the possibility of eradication -a deceptive vision of a malaria-free world through application of a wonder pesticide. The cause of polio eradication took the form of a gripping humanitarian crusade to free the world's children in perpetuity from this crippling disease by the end of the second millennium. It is also interesting to observe how the policy images and their policy venues influenced one another reciprocally. The transnational coalitions that promoted disease control campaigns both shaped and were shaped by these understandings of disease threats and the perceptions of their amenability to human control.
Investigating the formation of global health priorities
The formation of global health priorities has received little systematic study in the health policy literature. 7 This paper represents one effort, concentrated on a limited set of communicable diseases. We suggest a number of related questions to expand these inquiries. Have other disease control efforts follow punctuated patterns or is there something unique to the cases of polio, malaria and tuberculosis that limits the scope of generalizability of this study? How did priority for AIDS, leprosy, schistosomiasis, smallpox, African river blindness and other infectious and parasitic diseases develop?
Why have acute respiratory infections and several diarrhoeal diseases received so little attention relative to their global burden? Does the emergence of priority for non- 
